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EDITORIAL
PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN CONNECTICUT
Apropos of the article in our last number by Mr. De Forest we
have the following letter from the Hon. William M..Maltbie, Justice of the Supreme Court of Errors in Connecticut.
The people of that state rightly have great pride in their Public
Defender law. The more or less current opinion that the Public Defender there is a local officer is an error. He is a state officer. This
is an important point and Mr. Justice Maltbie is givifig it emphasis
here.-R. H. G.
"In Connecticut Public Defenders are state, not local, officials.
The law providing for their appointment was originally passed in
1917 and has been somewhat amended by Chapter 129 of the Public
Acts of 1921 and Chapter 122 of the Public Acts of 1923. In June
of each year all the judges of the Superior Court, which is the highest
trial court in the state, have an annual meeting and the statute directs
that they shall then appoint a Public Defender in each county, except
New Haven, where two are appointed, and shall make such rules
and regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of the office.
This is the same method of appointment that is provided for the
highest prosecuting officers in the state, that is, the State's Attorneys.
The Public Defender must be an attorney of at least five years' practice. It is made his duty to act in defense of any person charged
with crime in the higher courts having criminal jurisdiction in the
county, if the accused is without adequate funds to employ counsel,
and he is also authorized, under such rules as the judges may adopt,
to appear for accused persons at preliminary hearings and before
committing magistrates. If the accused has some means, he is required to pay the Public Defender what he can, the money so received being paid into court for the use of the state. If there is
any reason why a Public Defender cannot or should not represent
a particular accused, the presiding judge may appoint some other
attorney to act in his place. At the close of each term of court,
the Public Defender renders a statement of his services and expenses
and the court makes him an allowance, to be paid from the funds
appropriated for the conduct of the court. In actual practice the
compensation allowed a Public Defender in the course of a year
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ordinarily amounts to approximately one-half the salary of the State's
Attorney in the same county."

"PUNISHMENT AND OTHER PENAL TERMINOLOGY"
The following has been received from Dr. George W. Kirchwey
relating to an editorial in our last number
R. H. G.
That was a vastly amusing exercise in logomachy in which Dean
Wigmore indulged in his editorial in the February number of the
Journal but it may be doubted if he was entitled to all the fun he
got out of it. His point of attack is a passage quoted from Dr.
William A. White's address before The American Bar Association
last summer, which reads as follows: "One of the serious defects
of the present system is that the vengeance motive still functions,
but under a disguise, namely, the disguise of deterrence, which makes
it seem like something else. . . . I will make the following
concrete suggestions: . . . The elimination of punishment as
a vengeance motive."
Now, Dr. White may or may not be right in his assumption
that the argument for exemplary punishment is only a disguise for
the vengeance motive but his most flagrant proposal is that punishment shall no longer be inflicted from that motive. And if we assume, what he doesn't say, that the current "penal terminology" of
deterrence and punishment is equally abhorrent to him, what of it,
so long as the "objective solid facts" of outlawry, imprisonment and
suffering as a consequence of conviction of crime still remain? Sugar,
under another name, would be as "saccharine" and pepper, under any
other name, as "mordant." Punishment does or it does not deter
potential offenders, and, if punishment, under whatever name, survives, whether for the avowed purpose of deterrence or, as Dr. White
would have it, as "a definitely constructive" means "of conditioning
conduct," will it not still and with the same effect teach the lesson
that the way of the transgressor is hard?
But it would be doing injustice to these brilliant antagonists
to take their word-play so lightly. This is, we must believe, only
the "topmost froth of" their "thought." Moving beneath it we can
sense a profound conflict of policy. The slogan of modern penology
is the individualization of punishment-a parlous doctrine, fons et
origo of the hopes and fears that underlie the controversy. Everyone accepts the doctrine in principle as a matter of justice and of
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social expediency. Applied, as the principle, for the most part, has
been, casually, sentimentally, ignorantly, it has nevertheless been accepted as a necessary mitigation of the stern justice of the law. But
what will become of the stern justice of the law when the principle
of individual treatment comes 'to be applied intelligently, systematically, in all cases? That, of course, is what Dr. White and his fellowpsychiatrists are after and it is betraying no secret to add that they
are quite willing to undertake the job. And if they do, in fact, put
their scientific knowledge and trained intelligence at the service of
criminal justice, may they not end by persuading us all-all of us,
at least, who have the courage to face the facts and the intelligencc
to apprehend them-that there is no crime without its extenuating
circumstances and no criminal who is not, in a real sense, the victim
of his fate? It certainly looks as though we were in for some such
revolutionary change in our attitude toward crime and the criminal,
with all its dire consequences to our cherished doctrine of individual
responsibility-a disconcerting prospect to those of us who regard
what Dr. White describes as "the present system" as the rock of
our salvation. The method of frightfulness will certainly play a
less important role under a system in which individual responsibility
has been swallowed up in social responsibility. Perhaps it will have
become superfluous. At any rate it will spare us the sentimentality
which goes side by side with the cruelty of the present system. Under
a system which regards the protection of society as the only aim and
the "punishment" of the recalcitrant member of the community as
only a means to that end, we may hope to embody in practice John
Dewey's pregnant maxim: "Causes are not excuses." Count Guido's
cry in "The Ring and the Book"-"WTho taught the dog the trick
you hang him for?" will have become irrelevant. This may be coldblooded, it may not be "justice," but it should be far more effective
as i social policy than our present system of "justice tempered with
mercy."
The present writer admits that he doesn't know what to do about
the disappearance of the Ten Commandments from our church
chancels, "where," as Dean Wigmore tells us, " they used always to
be displayed."
The writer confesses, with shame, that he never
noticed them when they wete displayed and that he didn't know they
were gone. Perhaps that -accounts for the tone and sentiments of
this communication. Probably it would not be out of place to refer
this problem also to Dr. White and his psychiatrists.

